Check to United States?
The impressive military parade in China, to celebrate the 80th anniversary of Victory over Japan Day in World War II, showcasing its military might and empathy between the attending leaders of Russia and India, prompted an investigation, which I gladly share, into the weaknesses and strengths of this potential alliance. Feel free to share it.
He Leadership US in an Age of Contention: A Geopolitical Analysis of the Eurasian Challenge
Executive Summary
This report offers a comprehensive analysis of the state of US global leadership in 2025, assessed in the context of growing strategic convergence among the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and India. The analysis concludes that US leadership is not in a state of linear decline, but rather in a paradoxical condition of "resilient fragility."
Its pillars of power—technological and corporate dominance, financial centrality through the dollar, and remarkable economic resilience—persist without a viable global competitor. However, these structural strengths are increasingly undermined by deep internal fissures, primarily crippling political polarization and an unsustainable fiscal trajectory, generating political uncertainty that acts as a global threat multiplier.
The challenge posed by the Eurasian axis is formidable, but its characterization as a formal "alliance" is imprecise. Rather, it is a "strategic convergence" or a "negative coalition," united primarily by the shared goal of eroding US hegemony and building a multipolar world order. This convergence is fundamentally constrained by insurmountable internal contradictions. The most significant is the deep-rooted geostrategic rivalry and the unresolved border dispute between China and India, which prevents the formation of a cohesive bloc. Likewise, the Sino-Russian relationship, though profound, is defined by a growing asymmetry of power, in which an economically stagnant and isolated Russia becomes increasingly dependent on China, assuming the role of a junior partner.
In this triangle, India emerges as the decisive pivot state. Its doctrine of "strategic autonomy" leads it to participate simultaneously in groupings led by the United States (the Quad) and by China and Russia (the SCO and BRICS). This deliberate policy of "multi-alignment" is not a sign of indecision, but a calculated strategy to maximize its influence and avoid subordination in a global order in transition. India's position acts, in fact, as a systemic stabilizer, preventing the consolidation of a rigidly bipolar world.
The contest for global leadership is being fought across multiple domains. The most potent challenge is not military, where the United States and its network of alliances maintain significant global superiority, but geoeconomic and institutional. The "de-dollarization" agenda driven by the BRICS+, catalyzed by the perceived "weaponization" of the US dollar, seeks to create parallel financial and trade systems to reduce dependence on the US-led order. Although dollar replacement is unlikely in the short term, this erosion strategy represents a long-term structural threat to US power.
The most likely future scenario is not a new bipolar Cold War, but rather an "unbalanced multipolarity": a system with several centers of power, but with an asymmetric distribution of capabilities, in which the United States will remain the most powerful actor, albeit with a diminished ability to dictate outcomes. To navigate this new era, US strategy must focus on two axes: exploiting the fissures inherent in the Eurasian bloc, primarily by deepening the strategic partnership with India; and reinforcing its own sources of resilience, which requires addressing its internal vulnerabilities and reinvesting in its network of alliances, its most enduring and unique strategic advantage. Ultimately, the future of the world order will not be decided by direct confrontation, but by the competition for alignment among middle powers, the archetype of which is India.
Section 1: The American Power Paradigm: Resilience and Fragility in a Multipolar Era
The debate over the United States' global position in 2025 is marked by contradictory narratives. On the one hand, arguments persist about an accelerated hegemonic decline; on the other, evidence points to a remarkable capacity for resilience. A deeper analysis reveals that American power is not in a state of simple decline, but rather exists in a paradoxical condition of "resilient fragility." This is characterized by enduring structural advantages that coexist with internal vulnerabilities and growing external pressures, both of which threaten the long-term sustainability of its leadership.
1.1. The Enduring Pillars of American Hegemony
Despite the challenges, the core infrastructure of American power remains largely unmatched. Several key pillars continue to anchor its preeminent position on the world stage.
First, the United States' technological and corporate dominance remains unmatched on a global scale. The power of its tech giants and the centrality of its capital markets constitute a formidable advantage.1
This innovation supremacy has been a key factor in its dominance since the end of World War II, attracting capital and talent from around the world.3As long as the United States continues to produce global giants and lead in innovation, its leadership appears secure.1
Second, the financial centrality of the US system provides unparalleled flexibility and power. The role of the US dollar as the world's primary reserve currency is a fundamental foundation of this dominance.3This position gives the U.S. Treasury extraordinary funding flexibility and significantly reduces debt sustainability risks, despite its relatively high public debt levels.4The depth and liquidity of its capital markets limit the potential damage of capital flight, as there are few clear and robust investment alternatives in the world, whether in Europe or Asia.1
Finally, the US economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience, defying pessimistic forecasts. Despite warnings of an impending recession, the economy showed robust growth, expanding 3% in the second quarter of 2025, far exceeding expectations.5This growth was driven by strong private consumption and significant job creation, contradicting predictions of an economic collapse.5This ability to recover from major shocks, such as 9/11, the 2008 financial crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic, underscores a remarkable story of resilience.3
1.2. Structural Cracks and Emerging Vulnerabilities
This resilience coexists with significant structural flaws that threaten the stability and sustainability of US power. These vulnerabilities are largely self-inflicted and emanate from its domestic political and fiscal sphere.
The most critical vulnerability is the deep internal political polarization. The country is perceived as more divided than ever, with the population's confidence in its governing institutions declining.3This division has been put to the test in recent years, revealing considerable fragility in the "American project."3This polarization manifests itself in recurring governance crises, such as debt ceiling disputes and government shutdowns, which project an image of instability and undermine the United States' credibility as a reliable global player.4
Along with political fragility, there are serious economic and fiscal headwinds. Despite short-term resilience, the United States faces long-term economic challenges that cannot be ignored. The fiscal deficit and public debt are at critical levels, jeopardizing medium-term fiscal stability.6Organizations such as the OECD and other analysts predict a slowdown in growth for 2025 and 2026.6
Furthermore, inflationary pressures persist, complicating the Federal Reserve's monetary policy management and pushing inflation further away from its 2% target.7This combination of high debt and slower growth creates a risk of stagflation.8
Domestic political uncertainty translates directly into uncertainty in foreign economic policy, acting as a threat multiplier. The imposition of tariffs and trade tensions have generated a negative shock to the economy.8Analysis by Morgan Stanley and the OECD estimates that these policies could reduce US real GDP and increase consumer prices.8
This unpredictability not only damages the US economy but also erodes the confidence of trading and investment partners, a necessary condition for resuming growth.6The causal connection is clear: internal polarization leads to erratic economic policies, which in turn incentivizes other global actors to seek alternatives to the US-led system to "de-risk," thereby directly fueling de-dollarization efforts and the creation of alternative blocs.
1.3. The Global Alliance Network: Force Multiplier and Strategic Burden
Amid these strengths and weaknesses, the United States' alliance system stands as its most distinctive and potent strategic asset. This network, built over more than 70 years, is a source of power that no competitor can replicate.
US alliances in Europe and Asia have been the cornerstone of the "liberal international order," a system that promotes democracy, market economies, and the rule of law.9This network is the country's greatest strategic advantage in confronting rising authoritarianism worldwide.9It provides immeasurable military, political, and diplomatic benefits, including intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and the ability to project power on a global scale.9
However, this asset requires ongoing investment and commitment. There is explicit recognition of the need to continually reaffirm and strengthen these strategic relationships, especially the transatlantic bond, to ensure their longevity.10
The debate over "burden sharing" has been a long-standing one, but ultimately, the benefits the United States derives from these relationships have been enormous, as demonstrated when its NATO allies invoked Article V for the only time in history in their defense after the attacks of September 11, 2001.9
Section 2: Eurasian Convergence: Deconstructing the "Alliance"
The premise of a formal "alliance" between China, Russia, and India challenging US leadership requires critical examination. The reality is more complex and nuanced. This is not a cohesive, unified NATO-style bloc, but rather a "strategic convergence" of interests. This convergence is driven primarily by a shared objective of countering US hegemony, but is severely constrained by deep bilateral rivalries, power asymmetries, and divergent long-term national objectives.
2.1. The Sino-Russian "Limitless" Partnership: An Asymmetric Axis
The core of the Eurasian challenge lies in the strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow. This relationship has deepened significantly since 2014, encompassing economic, diplomatic, and military spheres, with the shared goal of overhauling the US-led global order.11
This cooperation is manifested in an increase in bilateral trade, the signing of massive energy agreements such as the "Power of Siberia 2" gas pipeline.13, and the conduct of increasingly complex and frequent joint military exercises in the seas of Japan and China.14On a personal level, the strong relationship between Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, who have met more than 40 times, consolidates this axis.17
However, this partnership is fundamentally asymmetrical. China's dynamic and diversified economy has grown almost 20-fold over the past three decades, while Russia's remains stagnant and dangerously dependent on natural resource exports.11
The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent Western sanctions have dramatically accelerated Russia's dependence on China. Moscow now needs Beijing for economic support, access to technology, and diplomatic cover. This dynamic has forced Putin to accept a "junior partner" role, as he effectively has no other viable options.11
This asymmetry has profound geopolitical implications. China benefits greatly, ensuring a stable supply of energy resources, access to Russian military technology, and a strategic partner that distracts attention and resources from the United States.
However, the relationship is not without friction. Russia persists with long-standing fears of Chinese "economic colonization" in its Far East, and it is crucial to note that there is no formal mutual defense treaty between the two countries, meaning that military support in a major conflict is not guaranteed.18
2.2. India's "Strategic Autonomy" Doctrine: The Pivot State
India represents the most complex and decisive factor in the Eurasian equation. Its foreign policy, rooted in the postcolonial tradition of non-alignment, has evolved into a doctrine of "strategic autonomy" or "multi-alignment."19This strategy, summarized as "partner of all, ally of none"21, prevents its full integration into an anti-American bloc and turns it into the main battlefield of geopolitical competition.
In practice, this doctrine translates into simultaneous participation in competing geopolitical frameworks. On the one hand, India is a key member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), along with the United States, Japan, and Australia, a grouping aimed at ensuring a "free and open" Indo-Pacific and, implicitly, containing China's growing assertiveness.22
On the other hand, it is a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS group, forums led by China and Russia that actively seek to promote a multipolar world order.22From New Delhi's perspective, this dual participation is not a contradiction, but a strategic imperative to advance its national interests on multiple fronts.22
India's decisions are driven by calculated pragmatism rather than ideology. It maintains a deep and long-standing defense relationship with Russia, on which it depends for a significant portion of its military arsenal and for affordable energy supplies.20At the same time, it seeks ever closer economic and security ties with the United States and other Western democracies as a necessary counterweight to China's power.19
2.3. The Himalayan Obstacle: The Sino-Indian Rivalry
The greatest structural barrier to the formation of a cohesive Eurasian alliance is the persistent and often hostile rivalry between China and India. Their relationship is marked by decades of mistrust, friction, and an unresolved border dispute in regions such as Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.27
The deadly clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020 shattered any notion of an easy partnership and reinforced the competitive nature of their relationship.27
Although agreements have recently been reached to reduce tension and withdraw troops from certain points of friction on the border29These should be interpreted with caution. They represent more of a "strategic pause" or tactical détente than a fundamental resolution of the conflict.
They allow both countries to maintain dialogue in multilateral forums such as the BRICS, but they do not eliminate the underlying geostrategic competition. India remains deeply concerned about China's regional ambitions, its growing presence in the Indian Ocean, and its close alliance with Pakistan, India's archrival.17
Overall, Eurasian convergence is best defined as a "negative coalition." Its main unifying force is not a shared positive vision of the future, a set of common values, or a unifying ideology. Rather, its driving force is a negative objective: the shared desire to limit US global power and accelerate the transition to a multipolar order.32
This foundation makes the grouping inherently opportunistic, transactional, and fragile. Unlike the US alliance system, which was built on a (now strained) foundation of shared democratic values, the Eurasian coalition lacks this ideological cohesion. Its unity is therefore susceptible to fracture as soon as external pressure from the United States diminishes or internal pressures, such as the Sino-Indian border dispute, intensify.
In this context, India's policy of strategic autonomy should not be seen simply as an obstacle to the bloc's cohesion, but as a stabilizing factor in the global system. By refusing to fully align itself with either the US-led camp or the Sino-Russian axis, India acts as a crucial brake on the crystallization of a rigidly bipolar world order. Its active membership in both the Quad and the SCO forces both sides to compete for its favor, maintaining a geopolitical fluidity that preserves a genuinely multipolar system and prevents its own subordination to either of the two dominant poles.
Section 3: The Contention Across the Dominions: A Comparative Balance of Power
The competition between the United States and Eurasian convergence plays out across multiple domains, each with its own dynamics and balance of power. The challenge posed by China, Russia, and India is fundamentally asymmetrical. They do not seek to replace the US-led system component by component, but rather to erode its foundations, build parallel structures, and ultimately make the existing order less central and relevant to a growing portion of the world.
3.1. Economic and Financial Dominance: The Challenge of Dedollarization
The most direct attack on the structural basis of US power is occurring in the financial sphere. There is a coordinated effort, led by the BRICS members, to reduce global dependence on the US dollar.
This movement has been catalyzed by what many countries in the Global South perceive as the "weaponization" of the dollar through the extensive use of economic sanctions by the West, especially against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.34
The freezing of Russia's foreign exchange reserves and the confiscation of assets have generated deep concern in many nations, which are now actively seeking alternatives to protect their monetary sovereignty and economic security.34The BRICS+ agenda focuses on promoting the use of local currencies in bilateral trade and exploring the creation of alternative payment systems and reserve currencies.35
Two main alternatives to the dollar have been proposed, each with significant obstacles:
- The Chinese Yuan (RMB): China is actively promoting the use of the RMB for trade settlement, especially with major energy exporters.34However, its path to becoming a truly global reserve currency is blocked by significant barriers. The RMB lacks free convertibility, China's capital markets are relatively underdeveloped and under strict state control, and there is strong geopolitical resistance. Neither the United States nor other emerging powers like India are willing to replace dollar hegemony with yuan hegemony.34
- A Common Currency for the BRICS: The idea of creating a new currency, possibly backed by a basket of commodities or pegged to gold, has been discussed. However, this project faces enormous practical and political challenges. It would require unanimous consensus among very diverse economies, the creation of a credible issuing institution such as a unified central bank, and the overcoming of mutual distrust.34
The most likely outcome of these efforts is not a rapid replacement of the dollar, but rather a gradual erosion of its dominance and the emergence of a more multipolar international financial system, with several major currencies coexisting. Even so, this trend represents a serious long-term structural threat to one of the most important pillars of American power.
3.2. The Military Balance in 2025: Global Projection vs. Denial of Regional Access
In the military domain, the United States and its network of alliances maintain global superiority, but its ability to project power into the heart of Eurasia is increasingly challenged by the growing anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities of China and Russia.
Quantitatively, the United States maintains a commanding lead in key indicators of global power.
Its defense budget of $895 billion far exceeds those of China ($267 billion) and Russia ($109 billion) combined.37It has the world's largest air fleet, with 13,200 aircraft, and an overwhelming advantage in aircraft carriers (11 compared to China's 3 and Russia's 1), which are the main instruments for the projection of force globally.37
However, a qualitative analysis reveals important asymmetries:
- USA: Its main advantage lies in advanced military technology, unparalleled global logistics, a network of bases around the world, and vast experience in large-scale combat operations.37
- China: Its strength lies in the world's largest active-duty army (2 million personnel), a rapidly modernizing navy that is already the largest in terms of the number of ships (more than 370), and significant advances in disruptive technologies such as hypersonic missiles and artificial intelligence applied to defense.37Its submarine fleet, although technologically inferior to the US one, is large enough to "saturate" key maritime areas such as the Taiwan Strait.39
- Russia: Its power is concentrated in its massive arsenal of ground forces, leading the world in number of tanks (12,500), and in its nuclear arsenal, the largest on the planet, which provides the maximum strategic guarantee.37However, the war in Ukraine has exposed its serious deficiencies in modern naval and air technology, as well as in logistics and command and control.37
China and Russia have intensified their military cooperation, regularly conducting joint naval and air exercises to enhance their interoperability and send a clear signal of strategic coordination against a common adversary.14It is revealing that India does not participate in these trilateral exercises, which once again underscores the limits of a true Eurasian military alliance.
3.3. The Diplomatic Competition for the "Global South"
The competition for influence in the developing world, often referred to as the "Global South," is a key diplomatic battleground. Here, the United States and its alliance model confront an alternative vision offered by the expansion of the BRICS and the SCO.
These forums are explicitly presented as the pillars of a new multipolar world order.41With their recent expansion, the BRICS+ now represent a significant portion of the world's population and GDP.42They position themselves as a "counterweight to Western hegemony"42, offering a model of cooperation based on the principles of national sovereignty, non-interference, and mutual benefit. This discourse is very appealing to many countries in the Global South that feel marginalized by the Bretton Woods institutions or are suspicious of what they perceive as "Western paternalism."19
The expansion of the BRICS to include regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates is a clear sign that the G7's attempt to isolate Russia and dictate global norms has failed.44These countries are seeking to diversify their alliances and do not want to be forced to choose sides in the growing rivalry between the great powers.
This analysis of the domains of competition reveals that the Eurasian challenge is primarily geoeconomic and institutional, and not (yet) military on a global scale. While the military balance is shifting regionally, the most potent and immediate threat to US leadership comes from the systematic attempt to build parallel financial and diplomatic institutions. The strategy is not to defeat the US military in a global battle, but to make America's structural power—the dollar, its control of international institutions—increasingly less relevant and ultimately optional for the rest of the world. It is a strategy of erosion and bypassing, not of direct confrontation.
Section 4: Future Scenarios and Strategic Implications
The synthesis of the analysis of the United States' strengths and weaknesses, the nature of Eurasian convergence, and the balance of power in key domains allows for a projection of the likely evolution of the global order and the formulation of high-level strategic recommendations for the United States.
4.1. Trajectories of the Global Order: Beyond Bipolarity
The future of the world order does not fit simplistic models of the past. We are not witnessing the return of a bipolar Cold War or the emergence of a balanced and stable multipolarity. The most likely scenario is the consolidation of an "unbalanced multipolarity" (unbalanced multipolarity).47
This concept describes an international system with several major power centers—the United States, China, the European Union, Russia, India, among others—but where power is distributed unequally and asymmetrically. In this scenario, the United States will likely remain the most powerful individual actor in aggregate terms (military, financial, and technological), but its ability to unilaterally dictate outcomes will be severely diminished. It will face peer competitors in specific domains (e.g., China's economic power) and in specific geographic regions (e.g., Russian influence in Eastern Europe and Chinese power in Southeast Asia).
This new era is marked by a process of "deconstruction" of the post-Cold War order, characterized by trends toward deglobalization, dedollarization, demultilateralization, and a resurgence of nationalism and geostrategic competition.48
The result is a more volatile, fragmented, and conflict-ridden global environment, in which "strategic autonomy" becomes the guiding principle for most states, which will seek to maximize their flexibility and avoid binding dependencies.
4.2. Net Assessment of the Eurasian Challenge
The final assessment of the challenge posed by the convergence of China, Russia, and India must recognize both its formidable potential and its fundamental flaws.
On the one hand, the strategic alignment of the three largest Eurasian powers represents the most significant geopolitical challenge to American leadership in a generation. Their combined economic weight, vast resource base, demographic potential, and growing military capabilities allow them to challenge US influence across the Eurasian supercontinent and beyond.
However, this challenge is inherently limited by its internal contradictions, which act as its Achilles' heel. As analyzed, the deep and structural Sino-Indian rivalry, the growing and unbalanced power asymmetry in the Sino-Russian relationship, and India's firm adherence to a policy of strategic autonomy make the formation of a lasting, unified, and effective alliance against the United States highly unlikely. The bloc lacks the internal cohesion and mutual trust necessary to act as a unified and coherent geopolitical actor in the long term.
4.3. Implications for US Foreign Policy: A Strategy of Fissure and Focus
To successfully navigate this era of unbalanced multipolarity, the United States must adopt a "fissure and focus" strategy designed to manage competition without precipitating a global confrontation.
The first pillar, "fissure," involves actively exploiting the fault lines within the Eurasian convergence to prevent its consolidation into a cohesive anti-US bloc. This does not mean fomenting conflict, but rather exploiting existing divergences of interests. Key actions include:
- Deepening the strategic partnership with India: The United States should prioritize its relationship with New Delhi, strengthening cooperation through the Quad and in the bilateral areas of defense, technology, and economics. Supporting India's rise as a great democratic power serves as the most effective and natural counterweight to Chinese power in Asia and strengthens its incentive to maintain its strategic autonomy.26
- Exacerbating the costs of dependence on Russia:US policy should seek to highlight and increase the costs to Moscow of its growing subservience to Beijing. This could include diplomacy targeting Central Asian countries, which are also wary of Chinese dominance, and exposing the unequal terms of Sino-Russian economic agreements, forcing the Kremlin to confront the long-term consequences of its junior partner status.49
The second pillar, "focus," requires the United States to focus on strengthening its own sources of resilient power. This entails:Restore internal stability: The United States' greatest vulnerability is domestic. Addressing political polarization and restoring fiscal discipline is a strategic imperative to regaining credibility and reliability on the world stage.
- Reinvest in the alliance network: The United States' network of alliances is its most decisive asymmetric advantage. Washington must revitalize these relationships, treating them as true partnerships rather than transactional ones, to build broad coalitions that can address global challenges.9
- Maintaining the technological and information advantage: Continued investment in research and development is crucial to maintaining the United States' innovative advantage. Equally important is developing a sophisticated strategy to counter disinformation campaigns from China and Russia, strengthening local media ecosystems in vulnerable countries, and promoting a fact-based information environment.49
Ultimately, the great strategic contest of the 21st century will not be for total global domination, but for the loyalty and alignment of the "middle powers" and the Global South. The outcome of this competition will not be decided by a direct clash between the United States and a unified Eurasian bloc, but by the choices made by pivotal states such as India, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia.
The long-term success of the US strategy will depend on its ability to offer these nations a value proposition—in terms of security, prosperity, stability, and respect for sovereignty—that is more attractive than the alternative model proposed by Beijing and Moscow.
The United States cannot take their loyalty for granted; it must actively and competitively earn it.
The United States has the floor!
|
Metric |
USA |
China |
Russia |
|
Defense
Budget (USD) |
895
billion |
267
billion |
109 billion |
|
Active
Personnel |
1.3
million |
2.0
million |
830,000 |
|
Total
Aircraft |
13,200 |
4,100
(est.) |
4,100 |
|
Aircraft
carrier |
11 |
3 |
1 |
|
Tanks |
5,500 |
6,800 |
12,500 |
|
Nuclear
Warheads (Est.) |
~5,244 |
~410 |
~5,889 |
|
Key
Advantage |
Technology,
Power Projection, Alliances |
Manpower, Naval Growth, A2/AD |
Nuclear
Arsenal, Land Systems |
|
Key
Disadvantage |
High
Operating Costs |
Lack of
Combat Experience |
Technological
Lag, Economic Tension |
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